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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This case is an appeal of a disciplinary Order issued by the Idaho State Board of Medicine
revoking Dr. Pines' license and awarding costs and attorney's fees.
Course of the Proceedings

A disciplinary Complaint was filed on June 28, 2012, alleging five (5) counts against Dr.
Pines. An evidentiary hearing was conducted December 10, 2012 through December 13, 2012.
The Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March
21, 2013. The Board's Final Order was issued June 4, 2013.

Dr. Pines appealed to the District

Court and in a Memorandum Decision dated February 24, 2014, District Judge Michael
McLaughlin upheld the Board's legal conclusion that the four males were "patients" and
disciplinary violations by Dr. Pines supported revocation of his license.

The District Court

overturned the Board's Order on costs and attorney's fee.
Statement of Facts

The primary dispute in this case is whether the four, eighteen year old males were patients
at the time of the sexual exploitation of them by Dr. Pines.
Dr. Richard Pines was born

and is an osteopath licensed by the Board.

(Tr., Vol. II, p. 383, ls. 18-19.) Dr. Pines was first Board certified in General Psychiatry January
12, 2001 and re-certified April 25, 2011. Dr. Pines also became Board certified in Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry on November 2, 2001 and re-certified April 25, 2011. (Exhibit 9.) For
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purposes of the Board re-certifications, the evidence is undisputed that Dr. Pines only needed to
complete an on-line computer test. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 384, ls. 1-6.) No practice patients, clinical
tests or examinations were required for renewal of Idaho licensure or Board certification. (Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 384, ls. 7-14.)

Count One: N.R.
N.R.'s date of birth is

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, ls. 12-13.) At the time of the

sexual incident, he had just turned 18 years old. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, ls. 14-15.) N.R. was in foster
care from 2003 to 2004. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, ls. 19-23.)

He lived in foster care with Dr. Pines

from November 9, 2003 to February 20, 2004. (Exhibit 12, p. 2.) N.R. knew Dr. Pines was a
physician and a child psychiatrist. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 26, ls. 19-22.)
N .R. testified that, on various occasions, he asked Dr. Pines if he could work for Dr.
Pines for money. Dr. Pines told him to call when he turned 18 because Dr. Pines did not want to
get involved with or in trouble with parents. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 35, ls. 4-11.) N.R. turned 18
December 2, 2010 and again called Dr. Pines to see if he could work for him. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 35,
ls. 13-17.) Dr. Pines told N.R. that Dr. Pines had a big test coming up because he wanted to add
to his "doctoring license" for "osteopathy chiropracting" and that Dr. Pines needed a full body
subject to practice cracking bones and knowing where all the muscles were so Dr. Pines would
have practice for his real test. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 35, ls. 18-24.) Dr. Pines clearly told N.R. that this
was necessary for his licensure and N.R. agreed to assist him and was to be paid $100 to $200
each time Dr. Pines used N.R. to practice for Dr. Pines' test. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 36, ls. 2-9.)
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Dr. Pines made arrangements to pick up N.R. at N.R.'s home in Nampa at approximately
6:00 o'clock p.m. on January 29, 2011. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 37, ls. 17-25; Exhibit 4.) On the drive
from Nampa to Dr. Pines' home at Quail Ridge, Dr. Pines told N.R. he needed a full body subject
and Dr. Pines stated: "it's kind of a weird thing to do, you know, most people would look at it
wrong, so kind of not talk about it, don't tell anybody." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 38, ls. 18-25.) N.R. was
still a senior in high school. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 39, ls. 17-20.) Dr. Pines promised to pay N.R.
money to be a practice patient and N.R. understood that he was a practice patient. (Tr., Vol. II, p.
40, ls. 6-11.)
Upon arriving at Dr. Pines' Quail Ridge home and after Dr. Pines got the master bedroom
ready, N.R. and Dr. Pines went into Dr. Pines' master bedroom where Dr. Pines had a sleeping
bag laid out. (Tr., Vol.2, p. 40, ls. 17-20.) N.R. was wearing shorts and took his shirt off and
laid dovvn and Dr. Pines started showing him "muscles and stuff' and explaining that part of the
test had to do with checking for hernias. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 40, ls. 21-25.) Dr. Pines asked him to
take his shorts off and N.R. stated he began feeling weird because this kind of exam should be
done with somebody present so he started asking medical questions because he was feeling
weird. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 41, ls. 1-6.) During the process, Dr. Pines again told N.R. that, after Dr.
Pines passed his test, Dr. Pines would be able to do physical exams on athletes. (Tr., Vol. II, p.
41, ls. 10-15.)

Dr. Pines was still justifying the contact as an appropriate medical examination

on a practice patient. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 41, ls. 18-23.)

- ,., .)

After N .R. took his shorts off, Dr. Pines had him lay back down and Dr. Pines touched
N.R.'s genitals. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 42, ls. 5-9.) Dr. Pines grabbed N.R.'s genitals and told N.R. to
turn his head and cough. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 42, ls. 11-14.) Dr. Pines told N.R. Dr. Pines was
practicing for hernia exams for the medical licensing and Dr. Pines touched N.R.'s genitals four
times. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 42, ls. 19-24.) After the incident, Dr. Pines told N.R. to put his clothes
back on and gave him $100 and took him home. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 44, ls. 4-10.) Dr. Pines said he
needed to do the full body naked massage a couple of times and would pay N.R. again in the
future. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 44, ls.11-19.) Ultimately, Dr. Pines paid N.R. $2,000 dollars. (Tr., Vol.
II, p. 44, ls. 22-24.)
N.R. denied that he ever consented to have sexual contact with Dr. Pines and never
agreed to the examination with the understanding it would be sexual. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 45, ls. 412.) He allowed Dr. Pines to touch him only because N.R. trusted that it was actually part of Dr.
Pines' medical licensing requirements. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 45, ls. 13-16.)
The incident at Dr. Pines' house occuned January 29, 2011, and five (5) days later, N.R.
reported the sexual assault to the Boise Police Department.

Officer Thomas Miotke's written

report is included in Exhibit 4, pages 2 and 3. The facts N.R. reported to Officer Miotke are
consistent with N.R.'s hearing testimony. Detective Smith then personally interviewed N.R.,
with Detective Angie Munson, on February 4, 2011, at N.R.'s home. Their reports are included
in Exhibit 1, pages 4 through 7 and Exhibit 4, pages 12-13. The facts N.R. reported to them are
consistent with N.R.'s hearing testimony.
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As part of the investigation, the Boise Police Department attempted to set up a confront
call to Dr. Pines with N.R. present, but that was unsuccessful. Later, N.R. did have a telephone
conversation with Dr. Pines, but N.R. was only able to record a one minute audio clip. The
transcript of that short part of the conversation is included in Exhibit 1, page 7. It indicates N.R.
confronted Dr. Pines asking Dr. Pines whether Dr. Pines was telling him that the medical board
of osteopathy told Dr. Pines he had to get a practice patient, come take him to your house and
practice all these hernias exams. Dr. Pines responded: "It's part of the exam ... like I said ...
several parts . . . like I have several different levels I have to work on. See what I mean . . .
several different exams that I have to do on people ... like muscular - skeletal." N.R. asked him
if it was to get his medical license and Dr. Pines responded: "Not to get my ... to get my
certification (unintelligible) ... there is different ways that you certify .... " When N.R. further
questioned Dr. Pines about why the Medical Board would have Dr. Pines take a kid back to his
house to get him naked, Dr. Pines' response was what made you not trust me all of the sudden.
Count Two: D.P.
D.P. was born

and turned 18 on January 8, 2010. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 106, ls.

24-25; p. 107, ls. 1-4.) D.P. was in foster care from the age of 12 to 18 after his adoptive parents
parental rights were terminated. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 107, ls. 11-25.) While in foster care, Nancy
Caitlin was his social worker. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 118, ls. 14-17.) Dr. Pines had an affair with Nancy
Caitlin from approximately 2003 to 2008. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 509, ls. 3-22.) Dr. Pines provided
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formal respite foster care for D.P. on multiple occasions in 2004 and 2005 and for three days in
2007. (Exhibit 12, page 3).
On August 29, 2005, D.P. was admitted to Northwest Children's Home in Lewiston,
Idaho. Dr. Pines became D.P. 's treating psychiatrist. A complete set of D.P.'s treatment records
were admitted as Exhibit 5. The records establish that Dr. Pines was D.P.'s treating psychiatrist
from August 31, 2005 to September 26, 2007. D .P.' s records indicate a long and difficult history
of severe behavioral and emotional problems with intermittent hospitalizations for psychiatric
and behavioral problems. Dr. Pines diagnosed D.P. with oppositional defiant disorder, mood
disorder and ADHD. (Exhibit 5, page 3.) During D.P. 's time at the Northwest Children's Home,
Dr. Pines prescribed multiple psychiatric medications for D.P. and met with and provided
psychiatric care to D .P. on a monthly basis.
Dr. Pines provided testimony he was not really a treating psychiatrist for D.P. because all
of the visits included the attendance of other people. Such an argument is complete absurd! The
notes indicate Dr. Pines regularly met directly with D.P., and discussed how D.P. was doing and
problems D.P. was having. Dr. Pines was D.P.'s treating psychiatrist for almost two years until
September 26, 2007.
D.P. confirmed that Dr. Pines was the psychiatrist who treated him during the two years
he was at Northwest Children's Home and Dr. Pines was clearly his treating physician. (Tr., Vol.
I, p. 110, ls. 18-23.)

D.P. also confirmed that, after he turned 18, Dr. Pines gave D.P. drug

samples, including Zyprexa and Abilify, continuing to function as a treating physician for D.P.
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(Tr., Vol. I, p. 112, ls. 12-15.) Dr. Pines told D.P. not to tell his social workers that Dr. Pines
was giving D.P. samples because Dr. Pines could get into trouble. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 113, ls. 1-5.)
D.P. personally contacted Dr. Pines around April of 2010, shortly after he turned
eighteen. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 119, ls. 15-16.) D.P. had just gotten out of jail and needed money
because he was planning on getting married and his girlfriend was pregnant. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 119,
ls. 19-23.) D.P. called St. Alphonsus and left a message and Dr. Pines returned the call. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 120, ls. 1-7.) They then met up for dinner. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 120, ls. 9-12.) The dinner
occurred in July of 2010. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 123, ls. 4-13.) At the dinner, Dr. Pines asked D.P. to
come over and spend the night at his house. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 123, ls. 21-25.) They went in the hot
tub and Dr. Pines did a full body massage on D.P. after they got out of the hot tub. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
124, ls. 19-25.) Dr. Pines had asked D.P. if he was still having back problems and offered to
give him a massage to "work on" D.P.'s back problems. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 125, ls. 2-7.) The
massage was done in the master bedroom on the floor in front of Dr. Pines' bed and D.P. was
naked. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 125, ls. 15-18.) Dr. Pines first worked on D.P.'s back and then flipped
him over and massaged his front, but did not touch his genitals. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 125, ls. 23-25; p.
126, ls. 1-8.)
D.P. then moved to Salt Lake City for a while from August 2010 until around October
2010. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 126, ls. 12-21.) When he returned from Salt Lake City, D.P. approached
Dr. Pines and asked if there was any work D.P. could do for money. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 127, ls. 3-8.)
Dr. Pines agreed to have D.P. do work at the cabin. They went up to Garden Valley on a Friday
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around 4:00 o'clock and no one else was present at the cabin. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 127, ls. 13-24.)
D.P. used a leaf blower to blow pine needles off the driveway and out of the garage and swept the
deck and then he and Dr. Pines watched a movie, went into the hot tub and Dr. Pines took him
upstairs to Dr. Pines' bedroom to do a naked massage on D.P. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 128, ls. 3-15.) Dr.
Pines stated he needed pictures of D.P. to provide evidence of patients Dr. Pines was practicing
on to show that Dr. Pines was doing his work so he could get certified to become some sort of
"chiropractor or something with another special name". (Tr., Vol. I, p. 128, ls. 19-25.)

D.P.

recalled the term was "osteopath". (Tr., Vol. I, p. 129, ls. 1-2.) Dr. Pines said: "Do you mind ifI
work on you tonight so I can get some practice for the osteopathic license." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 129,
ls. 6-13.) D.P. agreed to that naked massage because he thought it was helping Dr. Pines'
licensure. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 129, ls. 22-25.)
Dr. Pines first massaged D.P. 's back including his feet, legs, thighs, arms, shoulders and
neck, and then flipped D.P. over on his back and worked on his joints, ankles and knees and
there was sexual contact. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 130, ls. 2-7.) Dr. Pines was gazing at D.P. while
rubbing D.P.'s belly and genitals and D.P. had an erection. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 130, ls. 8-18.) Dr.
Pines then masturbated D.P. even though D.P. did not ask him to do that. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 130, ls.
20-25.) Dr. Pines had driven D.P. to the cabin and he had no transportation. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 131,
ls. 3-17.) D.P. testified he was surprised, shocked, ashamed and confused and felt no one would
take his word against Dr. Pines and was concerned Dr. Pines would accuse him of some criminal
activity. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 131, ls. 11-16.) Dr. Pines had never asked for D.P.'s consent to engage
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in sexual contact and D.P. closed his eyes and tried to pretend it was not happening. (Tr., Vol.I,
p.131,ls.20-25.)
After the incident, Dr. Pines gave D.P. a towel to clean up and Dr. Pines pulled out a
camera from his drawer. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 132, ls. 19-20.) Dr. Pines asked D.P. if Dr. Pines could
take a picture from the neck down without D.P.'s face for proof that Dr. Pines was practicing and
getting in his practice time. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 132, ls. 21-25.)

D.P. agreed to the picture and

understood the picture was to prove Dr. Pines was practicing for his osteopathic license. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 133, ls. 1-8.) He trusted Dr. Pines that his face was not in the picture. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
133, ls. 12-14.) A copy of the picture which Dr. Pines has kept since November, 2010, vvas
admitted as Exhibit 21. That photograph clearly and unequivocally shows that it was a full
frontal photo with D .P.' s face in the picture and Dr. Pines had lied to D .P.

During the hearing,

Dr. Pines admitted that he had kept that photograph of D.P. under his mattress after it was taken
in 2010. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 529, ls. 1-4.)

When asked why he kept the photograph, Dr. Pines

stated: "Just to have a memory." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 529, ls. 8-11.)
Dr. Pines gave D.P. $200 after that trip to the cabin. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 133, ls. 20-24.) D.P.
had only done approximately one hour of work at the cabin. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 134, ls. 1-7.)
There was also another incident in November of 2010 when they went to the cabin and
D.P. was going to help shovel snow. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 136, ls. 14-20.) There was another naked
massage during that visit in November of 2010. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 137, ls. 11-13.) They watched a
movie, went into the hot tub and then went upstairs for the same type of sexual contact. (Tr.,
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Vol. I, p. 137, ls. 17-19.)

During the incident, Dr. Pines would explain what the various bones

were and how this was helping D.P.'s circulation. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 137, ls. 23-24.)

It took D.P.

approximately an hour and a half to sweep the snow off the driveway and after that incident, Dr.
Pines gave D.P. $150. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138, ls. 4-15.)
D.P. contacted Dr. Pines again to see if Dr. Pines could help D.P. with money to buy
diapers for his son who was born on

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 134, ls. 17-22.) This next

incident occurred approximately a week later at Quail Ridge. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 135, ls. 5-10.) Dr.
Pines came to pick D.P. up and take him to the Quail Ridge home where they watched a movie,
went in the hot tub, had another nude massage and similar sexual contact. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 135, ls.
13-25; p. 136, ls. 1-4.) Dr. Pines gave D.P. $80. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 136, ls. 8-10.)
D.P. confirmed that he had sexual contact with Dr. Pines approximately five times during
September to November, 2010. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138, ls. 16-24.) Dr. Pines gave him money after
each incident and Dr. Pines always drove D.P. to the house or the cabin. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 139, ls.
3-15.)

D.P. did masturbate Dr. Pines during one of the incidents. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 140, ls. 5-7.)

D.P. indicated there was a final incident with sexual contact in approximately April of 2011
when Dr. Pines gave D.P. $200 after the incident. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 140, ls. 22-25.)

Count Three: S.G.
S.G. was born

(Tr., Vol. II, p. 67, ls. 13-16.) He turned 18 years old June

22, 2006, and was just over the age of 18 at the time of the incident in question. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
81, ls. 23-25.)

S.G. was in and out foster care several times between the ages of 7 or 8 and 15.
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(Tr., Vol. I, p. 67, ls.17-21.)
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 71, ls. 7-9.)

S.G. did respite care with Dr. Pines at least three to five times.
S.G. knew Dr. Pines was a physician and a child psychiatrist. (Tr.,

Vol. I, p. 73, ls. 9-12.)
S.G. moved to Ohio when he was about 15 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 77, ls. 8-19) and returned to
Idaho in April or May of 2006. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 78, ls. 4-7.) S.G. was 17 years old when he
returned to Boise and turned 18 in the middle of June, 2006. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 81, ls. 15-19.)

S.G.

testified Dr. Pines was adamant that S.G. needed to be 18 for the naked massages. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
82, ls. 17-18.) In the Summer of 2006, S.G. and Dr. Pines were in the hot tub at Garden Valley
and Dr. Pines repeatedly told S.G. Dr. Pines needed to practice for an exam to renew his license
and Dr. Pines just went on and on. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 82, ls. 21-25.) S.G. got sick of hearing it and
agreed to allow Dr. Pines to do a naked massage. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 83, ls. 1-2.) Dr. Pines continued
to discuss the fact that Dr. Pines needed a practice patient and S.G. agreed to be a practice
patient. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 84, ls. 5-9.) Dr. Pines made it clear that S.G. had to over 18 because Dr.
Pines could not practice on a child. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 84, ls. 10-16.) S.G. testified the incident
occurred on the bedroom floor on a towel. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 84, ls. 21-23 .)
After S.G. agreed to be a practice patient, Dr. Pines went upstairs to get everything ready
and S.G. changed out of his clothes into a towel. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 85, ls. 2-4.) Originally, Dr.
Pines had S.G. lay on his stomach and Dr. Pines moved the towel up. Dr. Pines then had S.G.
flip over and take the towel off and S.G. was laying naked while Dr. Pines continued to massage
him. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 85, ls. 5-12.) S.G. felt extremely uncomfortable and did not know what to
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do since he was in the middle of the woods in a cabin so S.G. continued to "let it happen" until it
was over. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 85, ls. 22-25; p. 86, ls. 1-2.) Dr. Pines had driven S.G. to the cabin and
S.G. had no means of transportation. Dr. Pines touched S.G. everywhere, except his genitals and
his butt, but Dr. Pines did touch S.G.'s groin area. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 86, ls. 9-10; ls. 15-19.) Dr.
Pines was looking at S.G.'s genitals while this was occurring. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 86, ls. 20-22.) S.G.
felt uncomfortable and taken advantage of. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 86, ls.25; p. 87, ls. 1-2.) S.G. felt
completely violated. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 87, ls. 7-9.) Dr. Pines did not give him money then, but did
buy S.G. a bus ticket to return to Ohio. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 87, ls. 25; p. 88, ls. 1-2.) S.G. testified he
never consented to have sexual contact with Dr. Pines and did not agree to let Dr. Pines touch
S.G. for sexual reasons. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 88, ls. 14-19.)
Detective Bill Smith interviewed S.G. on March 4, 2011. His report of that interview is
included in Exhibit 4, pages 8 and 9. The facts S.G. related to Detective Smith are consistent
with S.G.'s hearing testimony.
Count Five: B.H.

B.H. was never in foster care, but was a close friend of Dr. Pines' son. B.H.'s birthdate is
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 163, ls. 15-16 and 23-24.) He turned 18 on April 24, 2005.

He

spent a lot of time at Dr. Pines' home during junior high and high school. (Tr., Vol. I, p. I 65, ls.
6-19.)

B.H.'s father had abandoned the family and Dr. Pines filled a father role for B.H. (Tr.,

Vol. I, p. 165, ls. 20-25; p. 166, ls. 1-4.) Dr. Pines took B.H. on trips and was therapeutic to B.H.
regarding talking about B.H.'s father. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 166, ls. 6-11.)
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B.H. filed a complaint with the Board of Medicine regarding an incident of sexual contact
with Dr. Pines occurring at the cabin in Garden Valley. (Exhibit 8.) B.H. incorrectly indicated
the incident occurred in 2001 when it actually occurred in Spring 2005 after the cabin was built.
The complaint noted Dr. Pines asked B.H. to help him. "He said he had his relicensing exam
coming up. Something to do with massage. It took place in upstairs master bedroom. I was
wrapped in a towel and Dr. Pines had me lay day [sic]. He proceeded to rub my body, eventually
knocking my towel loose. He gradually went down and touched my genitals."
During his hearing testimony, B.H. testified he was only at the completed cabin in
Garden Valley once. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 173, ls. 14-17.)

Dr. Pines told B.H. he had a renewal of one

of his medical licenses coming up and Dr. Pines needed to practice massages for his license.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 174, ls. 17-21; p. 175, ls. 3-5.) They went to the master bedroom at the cabin and
Dr. Pines had B.H. get out of his swimsuit and put on a really small towel. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 175, ls.
16-19.) Dr. Pines had B.H. lie on the floor on his stomach and Dr. Pines proceeded to lay on the
floor next to B.H. and rubbed B.H. only with one hand. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 175, ls. 20-25.)

B.H.

thought it was an odd kind of massage with one hand and felt like Dr. Pines was pleasuring
himself because he had labored breathing. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 176, ls. 8-11.) Dr. Pines had B.H. flip
over with the towel still on and Dr. Pines began rubbing his stomach and slowly his hands went
down and knocked off the towel and touched him "down there," when Dr. Pines touched B.H.'s
genitals. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 176, ls. 14-21.) B.H. clearly stated he did not consent to have Dr. Pines
touch his genitals or to have sex with him and B.H. was surprised by what happened. (Tr., Vol. I,
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p. 178, ls. 16-23.) B.H. trusted Dr. Pines and he believed Dr. Pines lied to him when he said he
had to do practice massages. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 178, ls. 24-25; p. 179, ls. 1-3.)
General Summary
Following the complaints registered by N.R. and S.G., the Boise Police Department
initiated an investigation, but the prosecutor elected not to file criminal charges. Copies of the
police reports have been admitted as Exhibits 2 and 4. In addition, Dr. Pines submitted himself
to the police department for a voluntary interview on March 17, 2011. A copy of the video taped
interview was admitted as Exhibit 20 and was shown during the hearing.

Consequently, a

complete transcript of that interview was also included in the record, beginning on Transcript
Volume II, page 211 and continuing through 293. During the video taped interview, Dr. Pines
readily admitted to having sexual contact with N.R., S.G., and D.P. after the boys were over 18.
Dr. Pines also admitted the sexual contact to Tim Sanders. Tim Sanders is a licensed
social worker and is a Clinical Supervisor for foster care in the Region IV Health and Welfare
area. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 311, ls. 19-20; p. 312, ls. 5-6.) Mr. Sanders testified that children in foster
care are a vulnerable population because they have been abused, neglected or abandoned and
foster care families are to serve as parental substitutes so foster parents are asked to be held to a
high standard. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 315, ls. 6-19.)

Power differentials for sexual abuse can occur

with age differences, educational differences and financial resource differences. (Tr., Vol. II, p.
323, ls. 23-25; p. 324, ls. 1-8.)

On June 30, 2011, Tim Sanders confronted Dr. Pines about the

information that Dr. Pines had sexual contact with former foster care youth.
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To this, Dr. Pines indicated this information was "true" and [he]
his actions were "not good", but that he did not have relationships
with these individuals before they became adults. I indicated that
this was behavior that was concerning and that this judgment and
actions were not considered to be consistent with the expectations
of a foster parent because of the power differential and the parental
role he had played in their lives." (Exhibit 14, page 9.)
Dr. Pines indicated he would not fight a revocation of his foster care license. On page 10 of
Exhibit 14, Tim Sanders expressed his opinion that these behaviors were not consistent with the
expectations of resource families who are to serve as healthy connections and models for the
children in their homes. He further opined that having sexual relationships with former foster
care children is a behavior that betrays the trust of vulnerable children, youth and young adults
and the expectation of the personal safety is the primary goal of resource families.
Health and Welfare sent a certified letter to Dr. Pines dated July 11, 2011 advising him
they planned to revoke his foster care license based upon sexual activity with previous foster
youth who had been placed in his home and turned 18. The notice further stated additional
information was received by the Department indicating Dr. Pines was involved in activities such
as disrobing and asking the youth to disrobe in his presence while they were in foster care.
(Exhibit 18.) In a written response, Dr. Pines did not deny the allegation of sexual activity, but
did deny that he disrobed or asked youth to disrobe in his presence. (Exhibit 19.)
In addition to admitting the sexual contact to the Department of Health and Welfare and
the Boise Police Department, when Dr. Pines made his personal appearance at the Committee on
Professional Discipline, he also admitted the sexual contact with these youth during his
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appearance before the Committee. He also prepared his own exhibits acknowledging the sexual
contact. (Exhibits A, B, C and D.)
Dr. Paul McPherson testified as an expert witness for the Board.

Dr. McPherson

graduated from medical school in 2002 and did a three year pediatric residency. From 2005 to
2007, he then did a two year sub-specialty training in child abuse and neglect. (Tr., Vol. III, p.
387, ls. 13-18.)

Dr. McPherson is Board certified in both general pediatrics and child abuse

pediatrics. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 389, ls. 9-11.) His training includes identification of suspected child
abuse and neglect, including both physical and sexual abuse. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 388, ls. 18-22.)
He currently serves as the Medical Director of the CARES Unit, which the child abuse unit for
St. Luke's Children's Hospital. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 389, ls. 19-22.)

Dr. McPherson's CV was

admitted as Exhibit 22.
Dr. McPherson testified "grooming" is a process in which an offender identifies victims
and engages the victims in sexual activity involving various steps. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 393., ls. 1318.) In general, grooming initially begins with the individual identifying a potential victim who
are often vulnerable because of circumstances or emotional or psychological health. (Tr., Vol.
III, p. 393 ls. 19-23.)

After possible victims are identified, the offender typically establishes a

relationship with the victim which will often include a power differential and will be enhanced
by different activities, such as engaging in fun activities, providing gifts, going on trips, and
providing attention. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 393, ls. 24-25; p. 394, ls. 1-4.) The offender will typically
engage the child in activities that may seem innocent, but are used to assess an individual's

- 16 -

vulnerability to increasingly intrusive sexual behavior. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 394, ls. 5-8.)

In Dr.

Pines case, that included having the children undress in front of him; Dr. Pines undressing in
front of the children; and giving the children massages when they were partially disrobed. (Tr.,
Vol. III, p. 394, ls. 8-12.)

As an offender identifies vulnerable children, the offender begins to

isolate the child to attempt to engage in more sexual activities and often secrecy or isolation is
involved. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 394, ls. 17-22.)
Dr. McPherson further testified that power differentials often occur in cases of sexual
abuse (Tr., Vol. III, p. 395 ls. 3-12. ) Power differentials can include being a father figure,
having a significant age difference, educational differences and economic circumstances. (Tr.,
Vol. III, p. 395, ls. 17-25; p. 396, ls. 1-11.) In the case of Dr. Pines and the four males, there was
almost a 30 year age difference. Dr. Pines had been a foster father or father figure to these four
young men. He was a psychiatrist with multiple years of post-graduate training and they were
still in high school. He had a lot of money and freely spent it on these boys.
Dr. McPherson reviewed all the Board's exhibits and Dr. Pines' deposition and testified
that in his opinion, Dr. Pines engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with the individuals listed
in the Complaint. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 396, ls. 17-20.) He identified grooming behavior by Dr. Pines
while the victims were still minors. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 396, ls. 21-25; p. 397, ls. 1-11.)

Having

acted as a foster parent, Dr. Pines was able to gain the trust of these children and could use his
psychiatric training to his advantage to identify children as possible sexual targets. (Tr., Vol. III,
p. 397, ls. 15-21.)

Dr. Pines would isolate the victims by driving them to his cabin or home
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when no one else was there and without any transportation to leave. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 398, ls. 310.)

Grooming behaviors can still be used with young adults, especially if they have just

recently turned 18. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 389, ls. 6-12.)

Further, children in foster care due tend to

be more vulnerable than other children. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 399, ls. 21-25.)
Dr. McPherson expressed the opinion that Dr. Pines used his position as a physician and
foster parent to identify vulnerable children and used a well-planned, methodical approach to
target victims. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 401, ls. 15-25.)

Dr. McPherson further expressed his opinion

that Dr. Pines used his position as a physician to have the boys get naked to obtain physical
access to engage in sexual contact with 18 year old men. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 402, ls. 6-9.)

The

American Psychiatry Association Code of Ethics prohibits psychiatrists from having sex with
current and former patients. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 402, ls. 18-24.) Dr. Negron, one of Dr. Pines'
witnesses, confirmed it is a violation of the community standard of care for a psychiatrist to have
sex with a former patient. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 538, ls. 1-15.)
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

The Board's Order awarding costs and attorney's fees did not violate Dr.
Pines' due process rights.
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LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I
Standard of Review
The Court's review of the Board's action is governed by Idaho Code §67-5279(3) which
states:
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter
or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
It is well established law that the District Court will defer to an agency's findings of fact
unless the findings are clearly erroneous and as to the weight of the evidence, the District Court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of any agency. Idaho Code §67-5279(1); Woodfield v.
Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Wheeler
v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).
Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by substantial evidence, even though
conflicting evidence exists. Riverside Development Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d
1271 (S.Ct. 2002).

A court shall affirm an agency action "unless substantial rights of the

appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code §67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 ldaho
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575, 577, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996); Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare,
147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).

On questions of law, the Court exercises free

review. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (S.Ct. 2008);
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (S.Ct. 2002).
Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown by an appellant.
State v. Crawford, 104 Idaho 840, 841, 663 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App. 1983). An appellate court will
not search a record for unspecified and unsupported eITors. State v. Crawford, supra; Drake v.
Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App. 1983-84); Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764,620
P .2d 798 (1980); Idaho Appellate Rules 34 and 3 5.
In Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (S.Ct. 2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court reaffirmed the well established rule that issues on appeal are waived unless supported with
relevant argument and authority. The Supreme Court stated:
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority,
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975).
A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve an issue. 1Uichael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442,
445 263 Pl2d 990, 993 (1953 ). This Comi will not search the
record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd of Prof! Discipline,
138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in
compliance with the I.AR. it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v.
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 148 at 790.
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Bach was recently reaffirmed in Bettwieser v. New York
Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317,323,297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (S.Ct. February 22, 2013.)

II
The Board's Reference To "Boys" Is Not Erroneous And The Board's Clerical Error In
Referring To "Minors" Is Harmless Error
On pages 8 through 14 of Appellant's Brief, Dr. Pines contends he was disciplined for
uncharged conduct because the Board's decision refers to the four males as "boys" and in a few
spots refers to "minors".

The Board agrees Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of the

Idaho State Board of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 44 P.3d 1162 (S.Ct. 2002), held a physician's due
process rights include the right to be fairly notified of the issues to be considered. 13 7 Idaho at
114. In this case, the Complaint fairly advised Dr. Pines that the allegations against him were
sexual exploitation of a patient and the Board found he sexually exploitated patients. In fact, the
Pearl and Krueger cases are distinguishable from the present case because they dealt with
standard of care violations, which require greater notice of the particular violations. 13 7 Idaho at
115. The present case does not involve standard of care violations.
The undisputed evidence is that all of the patients were just over 18 and were still in high
school. It is common and accepted usage to refer to young men, and particularly high school
students, as "boys". In fact, the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines boys as: "a male
child" or "a young man".

The Cambridge American English Dictionary online, defines "boy" as

"a male child or, more generally, a male of any age". The American English Oxford Dictionary
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online defines "boy" as "a male child or young man". Consequently, there was no err in referring
to the males as "boys."
The Board agrees the Final Order referred to the 18 years old males as "minors" in a few
places in the Final Order which was drafted by the Board's in-house attorney. The Board
concedes those references to "minors" are clearly clerical errors because, in fact, no evidence was
ever presented and neither party ever contended that the any of the four males were minors when
the naked massages occurred. In fact, the Board correctly stated: "The real irony of this case is
that Dr. Pines perverted his license to practice medicine for the sole purpose of engaging in
inappropriate and unethical sexual activity with the boys and grooming them to engage in sexual
activity when they reach the age of 18." (Emphasis added.) (Final Order, page 3.) There is at
most an inconsistency in the factual findings. If the Court determines the Board's findings and
conclusions are inadequate or need clarification, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter
to the Board for further proceedings. Idaho Code §67-5279(3) clearly states that: "If the agency
action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or in part, and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary." It is well established that inadequate findings must be remanded to
the Board for further proceedings.

Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho

738, 747 and 757, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline,
137 Idaho 596, 51 P.3d 410 (S.Ct. 2002); University of Utah Hospital v. Clerk of Minidoka, 114
Idaho 662, 760 P.2d 1 (S.Ct. 1988); Application of Hayden Pines Water Co., 111 Idaho 331, 723
P.2d 875 (S.Ct. 1986).

- 22 -

More significantly, Dr. Pines was never charged with criminal sexual misconduct with a
''minor". He was charged with sexually exploiting "patients", in violation of Idaho Code §541814(21) and Idaho Code §18-919 and Idaho Code §54-1814(22) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d.
The Board found Dr. Pines did violate these disciplinary rules and statutes. It is irrelevant what
age the patients were with respect to these violations. Consequently, the incorrect reference to
"minors" in a couple of places in the Final Order is harmless error. On appeal, harmless appeal
will not be used to overturn a decision. In the case of Taylor v. A.I.A Services Corporation, 151
Idaho 552, 559, 261 P.3d 829 (S.Ct. 2011), the Supreme Court restated the well established rule
that an appellate court will not reverse a lower tribunal if an alleged error is harmless and does
not effect the party's substantial rights. See also, Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 34 7, 355,
256 P.3d 755 (S.Ct. 2011).

III

The Board And The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding the Four Males
Were Patients
On pages 14 through 23 of Appellant's Brief, Dr. Pines argues that none of the four 18
year old males were real "patients" or placed trust and confidence in Dr. Pines as a physician for
purposes of the sexual contact. Throughout his Brief, the entire focus of Dr. Pines' argument is
that the four young men were not regular, ongoing patients of Dr. Pines who went to his office
for treatment. Dr. Pines ignores and never addresses the findings and conclusions of the Board
and the District Court that "practice patients" are "patients" for purposes of the Board disciplinary
proceedings.
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Beginning on Page 15 of his Brief, Dr. Pines argues the applicable statutes and rules are
unconstitutionally void for vagueness and as applied to Dr. Pines. Unfortunately, Dr. Pines never
raised these issues before the Board and has now waived the ability to raise constitutional
challenges on appeal. An appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal, including constitutional challenges to statutes and rules. Urban Renewal Agency of the
City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (S.Ct. 2009); Cox v. Hollow Leg Pub &
Brewerv, 144 Idaho 154, 158 P.3d 930 (S.Ct. 2007); Cowles Publishing Companv v. Kootenai
Countv Board of County Commissioners, 144 Idaho 259, 1059 P.3d 896 (S.Ct. 2007). Dr. Pines
did not raise the constitutionality of the statutes and the rules in his Answer or in any of his
arguments or briefing at the Board level.
In addition, as will be discussed, the cases of Levin and Hall have upheld the
constitutional validity of these statutes and rules. The Board submits that the applicable statutes
are not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. They give clear warning to a physician that if a
physician lies to a patient and tells them they are a patient they can be subject to discipline for
mistreating that patient.
Dr. Pines cites the cases of Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711
(1979); H& V Engineering, Inc., v. Idaho State Board of Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55 (1987); and Krueger v. Board of Professional Discipline
ofldaho State Board of Medicine, 122 Idaho 577, 836 P.2d 523 (1992) and he argues the Board
relied solely upon its own expertise in interpreting the statute. As con-ectly noted by the District
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Court, the Board's ruling that practice patients fall within the statute is a conclusion of law and
the Board did not rely "solely upon its own expertise while disregarding the plain statutory
language, the actual evidence, and its own witnesses", as Dr. Pines contends. (Appellant's Brief
p. 17.) Dr. Pines then cites various testimony which does establish that the four males were not
regular patients of Dr. Pines who went to his office for treatment.

However, Dr. Pines

completely ignores the evidence establishing that he told them they were "practice patients".
The Hearing Officer found, and the undisputed evidence establishes, the sexual contacts
occurred after each of the four individuals was over the age of 18. The Hearing Officer stated:
"During the course of the discussion with Dr. Pines, he acknowledged that he had sexual
relationships with the individuals in this case but that all such incidents occurred after they had
reached 18 years of age." (Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pages 3-5.)
On pages 12 and 13, the Hearing Officer further found:
The evidence in this case demonstrates that representations were
made by Dr. Pines to each of the individuals that the massages and
sexual contacts were required for recertification or relicensure, and
therefore by inference, appropriate from a medical standpoint and
related to the licensee's practice of medicine. These representations
were false. The individuals did not consent to sexual contact by
Dr. Pines outside of his representation that they were "practice
patients" and that such practice sessions were legitimate and
appropriate for his relicensure. Although there were subsequent
encounters between Dr. Pines and D.P., the initial encounters were
likewise the result of Dr. Pines' representations regarding
certification and relicensure and his need for a practice patient.
Likewise, Dr. Pines' representation to D.P. that he needed
photographic evidence of the practice session was a false
statement. These misrepresentations by Dr. Pines were similar
with respect to each of the named individuals. The Hearing Officer
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finds that the testimony of the individuals named in the various
counts regarding these "practice patients" was credible, and it is
noted that Dr. Pines at no point in his testimony directly refuted the
individuals' testimony or asserted that the individuals' testimony
was false.
As noted in the Board's Statement of Facts and as determined by the District Court, these
findings are supp01ied by substantial evidence. (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 12.) Dr.
Pines does not even try to challenge these findings.
Contrary to Dr. Pines' contention on appeal, all four young men unequivocally testified,
and the Hearing Officer and Board found, the only reason they agreed to the naked massages was
because they trusted Dr. Pines when he told them he needed to do the naked massages and
physical exams to further his medical licensure and Board certification. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 45, ls. 416; Vol. I, p. 129, ls. 22-25; Vol. I, p. 82, ls. 21-25; Vol. I, p. 178, ls. 24-25 and p. 179, ls. 1-3 .)
On page 14, the Hearing Officer again confirmed Dr. Pines lied to the four individuals
about the need to practice naked massages and physical exams as part of license renewal and
recertification and Dr. Pines misrepresented the nature and purposes of his physical touching. In
Paragraph 13, pages 22 and 23, the Hearing Officer found that Dr. Pines admitted the sexual
contact and encounters with the four individuals. Nonetheless, even though the Hearing Officer
found the boys were "practice patients" and believed Dr. Pines' lies, the Hearing Officer then
made a legal conclusion the four males were not "patients" for purposes of the alleged violations.
The Hearing Officer did conclude on pages 14, 18, 19, and 22, with respect to IDAPA
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22.01.01.101.04.d, Dr. Pines violated this rule which prohibits sexual abuse or exploitation
''related to the licensee's practice of medicine."
The District Court con-ectly found the Board did not reject, but rather agreed with, the
factual findings by the Hearing Officer that the four males were "practice patients" and that Dr.
Pines lied to the four individuals about the need to have practice patients to address relicensure
and certification. (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 14; Final Order, pages 2-4.) Rather, the
District Court correctly ruled the Board rejected only the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that
"practice patients" are not "patients" for purposes of the applicable statutes and rules. The Board
stated: "The Board, therefore, specifically rejects the Hearing Officer's findings that the boys
were not 'patients' of Dr. Pines within the provisions of Idaho Code §54-1814(22) and Idaho
Code §18-919." (Board's Final Order, page 3.) This is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact.
With respect to D.P., the Board also correctly found that Dr. Pines had been the treating
psychiatrist for D.P. for a lengthy period of time and Dr. Pines continued to provide D.P. with
drug samples and function as a treating physician after D.P. turned 18. (Final Order, page 4.)
The Hearing Officer did not address the issue of continued prescriptions to D.P. Since the Board
agreed with the Hearing Officer's findings that the four individuals were "practice patients", the
Board concluded Dr. Pines violated Idaho Code §54-1814(21) and Idaho Code § 18-919 and
Idaho Code §54-1814(22) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d which prohibits sexual contact with a
current patient.
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In Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738,905 P.2 1047 (Ct.App.
1995), the Court ruled the Board's findings of fact will be reviewed more critically if they
disagree with Hearing Officer. The disagreement in this case was on a conclusion of law and the
Board adequately explained the basis for its conclusion of law.
As physicians, the Board is also entitled to use its expertise to determine that a patient
can be more than just a person who pays the physician money and comes to an office for
services. Idaho Code §67-5251(5) states: "The agency's experience, technical competence and
specialized knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of the evidence." The Board noted Dr.
Pines was an experienced child psychiatrist. (Final Order, page 7.) The Board noted Dr. Pines
"held himself out as a physician" when he told the four individuals they were "practice patients."
(Final Order, page 2.) The Board noted the four males clearly understood they were "practice
patients" and trusted Dr. Pines as a physician and believed Dr. Pines' lies that he needed to
practice the naked massages upon them as "practice patients" for purposes of recertification or
licensure. (Final Order, page 3.) The Board further noted that Dr. Pines accomplished the sexual
contact by means of false representations that the sexual contact was "for bona fide medical
purpose by a physician." (Final Order, page 3.) All of these findings are based upon substantial
evidence.
The Board also concluded: "Since physicians' practice medicine', 'practice patients'
certainly fall within the statutory definitions and coverage of the Medical Practice Act." (Final
Order, page 3.) The Board reviewed the statutory definition of "physician" in Idaho Code §54-
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1803(3) and "medical care provider" in Idaho Code § 18-919(2) in supporting their conclusion.
(Final Order, page 5.) Further, the Board reviewed the definition of "practice of medicine" as set
forth in Idaho Code §54-1803(1). The Board stated:
The Board also noted that the Medical Practice Act and relevant
IDAPAs do not define the word 'patient'. Giving the word 'patient'
its usual and ordinary meaning, a 'patient' is an individual who
receives any professional services from the physician. The word
'patient' should not be narrowly construed or dependent upon
arriving at a medical office or paying for services rendered as many
physicians go to their patients and accept what Medicare allows.
(Final Order, page 5.)
In their decision, the Board correctly concluded the four young men were "patients" for
purposes of the violations. The Board stated:
Further, Idaho Code § 18-919 prohibiting sexual
exploitation by a medical care provider never defines the word
"patient". Idaho Code §18-919 also provides extensive definitions
of who is a medical care provider and what sexual contact or
touching is improper. Dr. Pines' conduct fits squarely within all of
those specific definitions.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Board made a
factual finding, contrary to that of the Hearing Officer that these
boys were "patients" within the contemplation of these statutes.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Board made a factual
finding the boys were "patients". As the boys were his "patients",
Dr. Pines' conduct fit squarely in the prohibited conduct set forth in
IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d which prohibits sexual contact with a
current patient. (Final Order, page 6.)
Two Idaho cases have upheld the validity of IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d with respect to
current patients. Levin v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 133 Idaho 413, 987 P.2d, 1028 (S.Ct.
1989), upheld the validity of the Board's regulation against a constitutional challenge with respect
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to current patients. The Supreme Court noted that the regulation is supported by Idaho Code
§54-1814(22) which prohibits abuse or exploitation of a patient ansmg from the trust and
confidence placed in the physician by the patient. The Court ruled there was no overbreath or
vagueness in the rule and its application to a current patient.
On Page 21 of his Brief, Dr. Pines cites the Levin case for the argument that consensual
sexual relationships between adults cannot violate Idaho Code §54-1814(22). The error in his
argument is that every one of the witnesses testified that they did not consent to have sex with
Dr. Pines. Rather, they were lied to so the sex was not consensual.
The more recent case of Hall v. Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians, LLC, 155 Idaho
322, 312 P.3d 313 (S.Ct. 2013), again upheld the validity of IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d and
further ruled a physician can be disciplined for violating Idaho Code § 18-919. The Hall case
involved allegations of improper touching by a physician assistant and the plaintiff alleged
violations of the community standard of care, but did not allege Idaho Code § 18-919. The Court
stated:
We note that the result of this appeal would have been different if
Hall had identified a different statute before the district comi and
on this appeal, as there is a statute that does establish a statewide
standard of care governing medical professions which would apply
to Johnson's conduct toward Hall. In 1996 the Legislature enacted
I.C. § 18-919, which clearly and unambiguously draws a line that
health care providers may not cross. 155 Idaho at 330.
In Footnote 3, the Supreme Comi stated the Board of Medicine has adopted a statewide standard
of care in IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d which is virtually identical to that prescribed by Idaho Code
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§ 18-919. Consistent with the decision in Grover v. Smith, 137 Id. 247, 253, 46 P.3d 1105, 1111
(S.Ct. 2002), the Board of Medicine has been granted statutory authority to establish a minimum
statewide standard of care by adoption of ID APA 22.01.01.101.04.d.
Justice Jones' concurring opinion in the Hall states:
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's holding that I.C. § 18-919
establishes a statewide standard of care governing medical
professionals, as well as the Court's observation that the Idaho
Board of Medicine has adopted a statewide standard of care in
IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d. It practically goes without saying that
any medical professional practicing in the State of Idaho violates
the standard of care by sexually abusing or exploiting a patient.
... There is no room for variation in the standard of care when it
comes to misusing an intimate and confidential medical
relationship for the purpose of exploiting or abusing a patient.
Local option abuse and exploitation is obviously unacceptable .
. . . The second section of the Medical Practice Act, I.C. §54-1802,
states that the purpose of the Act "is to assure the public health,
safety and welfare in the state by the licensure and regulation of
physicians." (emphasis added.) There is no basis for distinguishing
between the requirements for obtaining a medical license and those
for keeping it. Engaging in exploitive or abusive conduct -whether sexual or otherwise -- that breaches the position of trust
bestowed by a medical license is as harmful to the patient as
providing medical care that fails to comply with the local standard
of care. Thus, I would hold that I.C. §54-1814(22) does establish a
statewide standard of health care practice, as does IDAP A
22.01.01.101.04.d, the regulation adopted by the Idaho Board of
Medicine pursuant to this statutory provisions. 15 5 Idaho at 331.

It is significant that, in all of his briefing, Dr. Pines has ignored and completely failed to address
this ruling in the Hall case.
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As correctly concluded by the Board, Dr. Pines' conduct constitutes commission of an act
constituting a crime involving moral turpitude, in violation ofldaho Code §54-1814(21 ). Idaho
Code §18-919, which makes it a crime for a medical care provider to engage in sexual
exploitation, states:
Any person acting or holding himself out as a physician,
surgeon, dentist, psychotherapist, chiropractor, nurse or other
medical care provider as defined in this section, who engages in an
act of sexual contact with a patient or client, is guilty of sexual
exploitation by a medical care provider. (Emphasis added.)
There is no definition of "patient" anywhere in this criminal statute. Rather, the prohibition
applies to any person acting or holding himself out as a physician or other medical care provider
for purposes of sexual exploitation. "Medical care provider" is clearly defined to be:
A person who gains the trust and confidence of a patient or client
for the examination and/or treatment of a medical or psychological
condition, and thereby gains the ability to treat, examine and
physically touch the patient or client.
The evidence unequivocally establishes that Dr. Pines abused the trust and confidence
that these young men had in him as a physician and tricked them into agreeing to naked massages
based upon the lie that he needed practice patients to maintain his medical license or Board
certification.
In the case of State v. McKeeth, 139 Idaho 639, 84 P.3d 575 (Ct.App. 2004), the Idaho
Court of Appeals considered a case in which a professional counselor was charged under Idaho
Code § 18-919 with six counts of sexual contact with female patients. He was disciplined by the
Counseling Board before criminal charges were filed. The Court of Appeals in that case clearly
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ruled that professional disciplinary actions are separate and distinct from criminal charges and
either can be pursued separately or concurrently with each.

Consequently, as correctly

concluded by the Board, it is irrelevant to a Board disciplinary action that no criminal
prosecutions were pursued. (Final Order, page 3.)
Cases from sister states support a finding of violations by Dr. Pines for his misconduct.
In Haley v. The Medical Disciplinary Board, 117 Wn.2d 720, 818 P .2d 1062 (Wash. 1991 ), the
Washington Supreme Court specifically ruled that the physician committed an act involving
moral turpitude "relating to the practice of the person's profession, whether the act constitutes
crime or not." The Washington Supreme Court ruled that "related to" means that the conduct
must indicate unfitness to bear the responsibilities of, and to enjoy the privileges of the
profession. 818 P.2d at page 1068. If the conduct raises reasonable concerns that the individual
may abuse the status of being a physician in such a way as to harm members of the public or the
conduct lowers the standing of the medical profession in the public's eyes, discipline can be
imposed. 818 P.2d at 1069. The Washington Supreme Comi stated:
In sum, Dr. Haley's conduct indicates unfitness to practice
medicine in two ways: it raises concerns about his propensity to
abuse his professional position, and it tends to harm the standing
of the profession in the eyes of the public, which both lead to
reasonable apprehension about the public welfare. Therefore, the
Board properly concluded that Dr. Haley engaged in acts of
unprofessional conduct under RCW 18.130.180(1). 818 P.2d at
1071.
A similar result was reached by the Washington Supreme Court in In Re: Disciplinary
Proceeding Against James A. Heard, 136 Wn.2d 45, 963 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1998). In that case, an
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attorney had a sexual relationship with a current client. There was no specific disciplinary rule or
statute prohibiting an attorney from having sex with a client. Nonetheless, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld a two year suspension from the practice of law finding that the attorney
committed an act of "moral turpitude" They ruled moral turpitude is conduct which violates
commonly accepted standards of good morals, honesty and justice. The Court stated:
[We] do not believe that Respondent, or any other member of the
bar, could reasonably have considered the conduct involved here to
be acceptable behavior under the rules governing the legal
profession. 963 P.2d at 826.
In W.S. Loui, M.D. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Hawaii 21, 889 P.2d 705 (Hawaii
1995), the Hawaii Board of Medical Examiners suspended the physician from practicing
medicine for one year after he was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault and
kidnapping of his medical assistant. The Medical Board found that Dr. Loui's conduct supported
disciplinary action based upon a conviction "of a penal offense substantially related to the
qualifications, functions, or duties of a physician." 889 P.2d at 708. The Court stated:
Physicians hold a position of public trust. As such, they have an
ongoing duty to maintain the highest standards of professional
conduct. This duty extends not only to the patients whom they are
treating but also to society as a whole. 889 P.2d at 714.
The Hawaii court noted that unethical conduct on the part of the members of the medical
profession is reprehensible and poses a real or potential threat to patients and undermines the
public's confidence in the profession.

The Court ruled that the conduct did not have to occur
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during the actual exercise of professional or occupational skills in order to provide grounds for
discipline.
In sum, the Board did not err in concluding the four males were patients for purposes of
violations ofldaho Code §54-1814(21) and Idaho Code §18-919 and Idaho Code §54-1814(22)
and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d.
IV

The Board Did Not Fail To Carry Its Burden Of Proof

Beginning on Page 23 of Appellant's Brief, Dr. Pines argues that the Board failed to
prove disciplinary violations by clear and convincing evidence. The Board does not dispute that
the burden of proof in a physician disciplinary proceeding is clear and convincing evidence.
However, the Board strenuously disputes Dr. Pines' contention that the Board has failed to meet
its burden of proof.
Again, Dr. Pines entire focus is on testimony that the four males did not have an ongoing,
regular physician patient relationship with Dr. Pines. However, Dr. Pines completely ignores and
never addresses the clear factual evidence that he told them they were "practice patients". Dr.
Pines has cited no contradictory evidence on that point. As noted by the Hearing Officer, Dr.
Pines did not dispute that evidence. (Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions, pp. 12
and 13.)
The Hearing Officer and the Board found, and the District Court concurred, that the four
males were all "practice patients" who trusted Dr. Pines and believed his lies that he needed to
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practice to retain his Board certification or licensure. Those findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Consequently, the Board has met its burden of proof on its finding that the four males
were practice patients.

The Board then made the correct legal conclusion that practice patients

are patients within the prohibitions of the charged statutes.
V
The Board Did Not Err On The Individual Counts

Beginning on page 25 through 48, Dr. Pines includes individual sections related to each
of the four males. However, the arguments within each of those sections are merely repetitive of
arguments previously made in the first half of Dr. Pines' Brief and the Board's response.
Consequently, those points will not be reargued.
On Page 31, with respect to Patient D.P., Dr. Pines cites the case of Levin v. Idaho State
Board of Medicine. 133 Idaho 413,418,987 P.2d, 1029,1033 (S.Ct. 1989) for the argument that
sexual exploitation of a patient is not a violation of the standard of care found in Idaho Code §541814(7).

With respect to the four boys, the Board's Final Order made absolutely no reference to

Idaho Code §54-1814(7) in its findings and conclusions. Consequently, Dr. Pines' reliance upon
the ruling in Levin is misplaced.
Dr. Pines further argues on page 33 that consensual sexual contact cannot form the basis
of a violation of Idaho Code §54-1814(7). As noted, the Board did not find Dr. Pines in violation
of that statute. However, Idaho Code § 18-919(a) specifically provides that consent of the patient
is not a defense to a violation of that statute.
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On pages 33 and 34, with respect to Patient D.P., Dr. Pines argues that Idaho Code §541814(22) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d do not apply to former patients. His argument ignores
the fact that the Board found that Patient D.P. was a "current practice patient." The Board also
correctly found that, with respect to D.P., the patient was also a current patient because Dr. Pines
continued to provide medications. (Final Order, p. 4.)
On page 35, Dr. Pines incorrectly argues there was no doctor patient relationship between
Dr. Pines and D.P. even when he was a patient at No1ihwest Children's Home. That argument is
completely unsupported by the evidence. The evidence unequivocally establishes that Dr. Pines
treated Patient D.P. monthly as a treating psychiatrist for two (2) years on a monthly basis.
(Exhibit 5.) For Dr. Pines to now argue that there was no doctor patient relationship between Dr.
Pines and Patient D.P. when he was at Northwest Children's Home is ludicrous.
On page 36, Dr. Pines complains that the Board's findings that Dr. Pines gave medication
to D .P. after he turned 18 was inconsistent with the Hearing Officer. However, in fact, the
Hearing Officer never addressed that factual issue and the Board is free to make that finding.
Their finding is supported by a substantial, although conflicting, evidence. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 112, ls.
12-15.)
VI
Dr. Pines Has Waived His Right To Complain About The Date Error In The Complaint
Regarding B.H.

In his Brief beginning at page 44, Dr. Pines argues that no violation can be found with
respect to B.H. because of a date error occurring in the Complaint. Paragraph 18 of the
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Complaint alleged that the sexual incident occurred in June, 2001, when the evidence at the
hearing established the incident occurred in the Spring of 2005. The Board acknowledges that
there was an error in the date alleged because B.H. initially misstated the date in his complaint to
the Board due to the lapse of time. The Complaint clearly delineated the nature of the sexual
contact and that the conduct occurred at the cabin in Garden Valley which was not built until late
2004. However, Dr. Pines never raised the date error as an issue during the Board proceedings
and has now waived the ability to raise that issue on appeal. The transcript reveals that Dr. Pines
never objected to the testimony of B.H. clarifying the date error at the time of the hearing. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 172, ls. 1-24.) Further, a detailed review of the Hearing Officer's decision and Dr.
Pines' Closing Argument and Brief reveals that Dr. Pines never raised the date variance as an
issue during the Board proceedings.
It is well settled law that issues not raised below will not be reviewed on appeal. In the
case of Allied Bail Bonds v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405,258 P.3d 340 (S.Ct. 2011), the
County contended Allied had not pled its claim of a constitutionally protected property interest
with sufficient particularity and was therefore precluded on appeal from asserting such claim.
The Court stated:
... However, it appears from the record before the court that the
Sheriff did not present this argument prior to this appeal.
"Appellate Court review is limited to the evidence, theories and
arguments that were presented below." 151 at 413.
Various other cases have ruled that an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal.

Insight, LLC v. Gunther, 154 Idaho 779, 788, 302 P.3d 1052 (S.Ct. 2013);
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Telford v. Nve, 154 Idaho 606, 612, 301 P.3d 264 (S.Ct. 2013); Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho
27, 33, 293 P.3d 651 (S.Ct. 2013); Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812,
252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011).
Fmiher, the Board concurs that various cases cited by Dr. Pines provide that due process
requires that the allegations of the Complaint be sufficient to allow a physician to prepare a
defense. In this case, Dr. Pines clearly had that opportunity. In fact, it was Dr. Pines himself
who admitted the sexual contact with B.H., but clarified the date the sexual contact actually
happened. (Exhibits D and H.) Consequently, Dr. Pines did have an opportunity to prepare a
defense and the variance in the date is harmless e1Tor.
VII
The District Court Erred In Overturning The Board's Award
of Costs And Attorney's Fees

In their District Court appeal, Dr. Pines challenged the Board's award of costs and
attorney's fees in the amount of $37,755.07. In its Memorandum Decision and Order on pages 24
through 26, the District Court overturned the Board's Order on costs and fees on the basis that
Dr. Pines was not afforded due process on the award. The District Court relied upon the case of
Haw v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 140 Idaho 152, 160, 90 P.3d 902,910 (S.Ct. 2004).
The Court ruled the Board's imposition of costs and fees violated Dr. Pines' due process
rights because he had no oppo1iunity to be heard on the issue. Idaho Code §54-1806A(9)(e)
grants the Board authority, if grounds for discipline are found to exist, to issue an order assessing
costs and attorney's fees against the physician for any investigation and administrative
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proceedings.

The Attorney General's Rules of Practice and Procedure are applicable to the

procedure to be followed.
The case of Haw v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 140 Idaho 152, 159, 90 P.3d 902, 909
(S.Ct. 2004) held that notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given before a cost and fee
award. However, the applicable Attorney General Rule was adopted in 2011 after the Haw case.
The procedures followed by the Board fully complied with the Attorney General's Rules of
Practice and Procedure on costs and fee awards found at IDAPA 04.11.01.741. Attached as
Exhibit A to the Board's Final Order was a detailed cost summary upon which the Final Order for
costs and attorney's fees was based, including a breakdown of the amount of the various costs
and fees. In addition, the Board attorney, Jean R. Uranga, filed an Affidavit dated June 10, 2013,
supporting her costs and attorney's fees.
Dr. Pines never filed any objection or request for hearing on the award of costs and
attorney's fees. ID APA 04.11.01.741.02.a provides that, when a final order of an agency awards
costs and attorney's fees to the agency, the agency is allowed no fewer than fourteen (14) days to
file necessary papers, for example a memorandum of costs, affidavits, exhibits, etc., quantifying
and supporting the costs and fees. In this case, the Board actually attached an exhibit to the Final
Order quantifying and supporting the costs and fees as required by the Rule. In addition, the
Board attorney filed an Affidavit setting forth her costs and attorney's fees. IDAPA
04.11.01.741.04 then specifically states any opposition to a request for costs and fees "must be
filed and served within fourteen (14) days of the service date".
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Dr. Pines never filed any

objection to the award for costs and attorney's fees and now is precluded from contesting the
award.
The procedure followed by the Board complied with the Attorney General's Rules and the
Attorney General's Rules follow a procedure similar to that used for costs and attorney's fees in
civil actions. Rule 54, I.R.C.P.

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party files an

affidavit and a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees. Rule 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5), I.R.C.P ..
The opposing party then must file an actual objection to the costs and fees request before a
hearing is scheduled. Rule 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6), I.R.C.P. If no objection is timely filed, the
party waives any objection to costs and attorney's fees. Various cases have held that failure to
object constitutes a waiver of an objection. Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173
(1982); Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (Ct.App. 1988).
Consequently, Dr. Pines was given notice an opportunity to request a hearing and waived
his right to do so. The District Court's decision to overrule the Board's costs and attorney's fees
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests that Dr. Pines' appeal should
be denied. If the Court determines that the Board's findings and conclusions are inadequate, the
case should be remanded to the Board for further proceedings.
With respect to the Board's cross appeal, the Board respectfully requests the Court to
determine that the costs and fee award did comply with the Attorney General's Rules of Practice
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and Procedure. Dr. Pines had an opportunity to request a hearing and failed to do so. He cannot
object to that procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This

ofSeptember, 2014.

URANGA & URANGA
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